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I. INTRODUCTION
Budgeting is a fact of life for not only individuals, but
all groups and organizations for which there are unlimited
"wants" but limited resources. The U.S. Navy is no exception.
Its "wants" (which are often interpreted by the individual
or organization as "bare-bones needs") are subjected to scrutiny
and questioning as they go up the chain of command, on to the
President and the Congress. At each level, a process of cuts,
reclamas, restorations, and justifications takes place.
It is one thing to study the logical and repetitive steps
in the budgeting process, or "the way it is supposed to be
done." It is another to assume that the budgeting process is
just that—an orderly series of steps which take place year
after year in the same manner. Were this assumption made,
budgeting outcomes themselves would be quite logical, predic-
table and repetitive.
But while the DON budgeting process is indeed structured,
the final outcomes are not always predictable. Many differ-
ent factors play a part in the process, not the least of
which is the "human" factor. The budgeting process is not a
series of numbers fed into a machine, manipulated, and spit
out to the other end. It is a human process, where numbers
are subject to the values, objectives, and priorities of
several people along the way. It is a process whereby limited
resources are allocated to different agencies and programs,
each with their own worthy causes.
The budgeting process, then, is more complicated than it
appears on the surface. There is a great body of literature
available resulting from studies done to try to "compartmenta-
lize" the budgeting process. Within this literature, two
main theories are present. Briefly, an incremental model
proposes that a budget is arrived at by policy makers who
consider only small parts of the budget and make incremental
additions or subtractions to these parts from last year's budget.
An opposing view is that of program budgeting— looking at the
budget as a whole and emphasizing changes in programs and
policy.
This thesis will explore the factors affecting the final
outcome of the DON budget over a thirty year period from FY
55 through FY 84. Trends are analyzed for the total DON
outlays as well as individual appropriations areas. The analysis
closely follows the Master of Science thesis written by John
Anderson at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1983. While his
study examined trends in the DOD as a whole, this thesis will
examine only the Navy segment of the budget, and will compare
trends with those discovered by Anderson.
In addition, this thesis will explore the following
questions
:
1) Do these data fit the pattern of either an incremental
or program approach?
2) How much do the politics of the Congressional Appropria-
tions committees enter into the final outcome of the DON
budget?
3) When DON priorities shift, do these priorities hold up
as the budget passes through Congress?
4) Are budget cuts inevitable, causing the DON and other
agencies to pad their requests in order to maintain
a reasonable base at the end of the process?
5) Do some segments of the DON budget survive these cuts
better than others? Do some programs receive larger
increases during good times?
6) Are trends in the DON budget obscured when looking at
only total figures rather than individual appropriations
areas?
The following chapter will give some further background
on the well-established incremental and program-based theories,
as well as a look at the Congressional appropriations process
as it affects the outcome of the DON budget.
II. BACKGROUND
In the wide range of budgetary literature available, two
main themes seem to be present. One school of thought empha-
sizes that Federal budgeting as it is done today is incremental,
that is, concentrates on bits and pieces of the budget and
making incremental additions or subtractions, rather than
emphasizing program and policy [Ref. l:pp. 135-136] . This
incrementalist theory is believed by some to be both stable
and linear, to the extent that it can be represented by a
simple model [Ref. 2:p. 529].
One of the greatest arguments for using an incremental
process is the relative ease with which calculations can be
made. Davis, Demster, and Wildavsky [Ref. 2] subscribe to an
incrementalist theory and state that:
Participants in budgeting deal with their overwhelming
burdens by adopting aids to calculations. By far the
most important aid to calculation is the incremental
method .... This year's budget is based on last
year's budget, with special attention given to a narrow
range of increases or decreases. [Ref. 2:pp. 529-530]
As Wildavsky [Ref. 1] also points out, this incremental
process tends to mask policy implications, since it is much
easier to agree to an addition or subtraction to a program than
on whether or not a program as a whole is good [Ref. l:p. 136].
The incrementalist theory is explored further by Lindbloom
[Ref. 3] who proposes that interagency disputes and political
alliances make very little difference in the long run and that
administrators rarely depart significantly from what they are
doing. They "muddle through" and make only marginal changes
in established operations, while budgets remain quite stable
over the years [Ref. 3:p. 88].
Another theory of budgeting emphasizes the program as the
primary item in the decision process, rather than merely an
incremental change. A programmatic theory by nature emphasizes
more of the policy side of decision-making. When policy is
examined, conflict becomes much more a part of the process, and
problems of calculation are increased when the desirability of
every program must be weighed against all others [Ref. l:p. 136].
How do these theories apply to the Federal budgeting proc-
ess and in particular, the Congressional appropriations process?
First, an understanding of the budgeting process itself helps
to shed light on the complexity of the factors involved. In
their article on priorities and policy in the budgeting process,
Natchez and Bupp [Ref. 4] refer to several stages in the budget
process. The process begins with the budget guidelines that
are sent down by OMB. Usually, agencies will respond to the
0MB by preparing "flash estimates" or "preview budgets." These
budgets serve to begin the process of negotiation, and, in the
weeks that follow, a series of informal estimates are estab-
lished indicating how much expansion is likely to be considered
reasonable in light of the administration's priorities.
On the basis of the information, the agency's comptroller
begins to aggregate budget requests from the operating divi-
sions within the department or agency. These estimates are
10
worked over by the Comptroller with an eye towards bringing
them in line with administration expectations. It is during
this part of the process that competition within the agency
reaches its greatest intensity. Each division struggles for
funds against the budgetary interests of the other operating
divisions, each trying to avoid the heavy hand of the Comp-
troller by shifting the burden of budgetary cuts to some other
division's programs.
The budget outcomes at this stage of the process become
formal requests to the President for funding and are sent to
the OMB for review. Acting "in accordance with the president's
program," the OMB "marks up" each budget, item by item, program
by program— cutting away wherever it can, accepting other re-
quests as submitted, and occasionally, adding money to some
project that the administration looks upon with special favor.
The entire thrust of the OMB at this point is to attack budget
requests that have produced unnecessary and expensive
settlements
.
Budgets then are normally marked up with a heavy hand and
returned to those who wrote them for reconsideration. Here
the agency or department has a choice: It can accept the
OMB's actions as they stand or it can appeal to the OMB for
some measure of restoration. Those items not disputed by
the OMB, or subsequently returned to the OMB by appeal, are
regarded as a settled part of the Administration's budget.
Each agency chairman or department secretary can argue for
restorations directly before the President.
11
The President's decision ends the process and the results
are printed up and sent along to Congress. The degree of
success that he has with the President is widely regarded as
an evaluation of his administrative worth and, at the same
time, a measure of the importance that agency or department has
in the administration. By design then, the budgetary process
produces a climate of scarcity in which the success of those
who participate is measured by the number of dollars they are
able to win. Indeed, the entire process of formulating bud-
gets within agencies plays upon the institutional interests of
bureaucrats so as to produce the explicit competition between
alternative "policies" [Ref. 4:pp. 952-953].
Probably the greatest influence in the budgetary process is
wielded by Congress, and in particular, the appropriations
committees. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees
have traditionally adopted the role of guardian, cutting execu-
tive branch requests. Historically, the Senate committee has
differed from the House Committee in several ways. The House
has had a primary position in the appropriations process. The
House also has tended to have longer, more detailed hearings
on the agency requests and has made deeper cuts in the requests
Agencies were in the habit of appealing cuts made in the House
to the Senate Committee, counting on the Senate to recommend
slightly more than the House in the majority of cases. [Ref.
5:p. 199]. However, changes in the appropriations process have
occurred over the last two decades, with the committees losing
12
some of the institutional power they once enjoyed. The Senate
Appropriations Committee is now more nearly the equal of the
House Appropriations Committee [Ref. 5:p. 208].
Since Congress as a whole cannot take on the entire burden
of budgeting, they tend to accept the verdict of the appropria-
tions committees most of the time, occasionally intervening
to keep the committees in line [Ref. l:p. 57]. Wildavsky con-
tends that the power of the appropriations subcommittees would
be diminished if their recommendations were very often success-
fully challenged by Congress.
The role of the defender also has its roots in the
respect for expertise and specialization in Congress,
and the ensuing belief that members who have not
studied the subject should not exercise a deciding
voice without the presence of overriding considerations.
[Ref. ] :p. 51]
Wildavsky states that committee members frequently concen-
trate on line items instead of various programs as a whole.
This "line-item form enable them to concentrate on the less
divisive issue of how much for each item" [Ref. l:p. 59].
He also sees budgeting as being fragmented.
Each subcommittee, and sometimes specialists within
these bodies, operates as a largely autonomous unit
concerned only with a limited area of the budget.
Even the subcommittees do not attend to all the items
in the budget but pay special attention to instances
of increases or decreases over the previous year . . .
fragmentation is further increased by the Senate Appro-
priations committee, which focuses its attention on
items that are appealed from House decisions. The
Senators therefore, often deal with a fragment of what
is already (through House action) a fragment of a fragment.
[Ref. l:p. 59]
Richard Fenno [Ref. 6] states that the "power of the
purse" is key to the power of the House of Representatives,
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and reducing its share is the single most serious blow it
could receive [Ref. 6:p. 176]. In addition, each individual
member has his or her own values and objectives in the appro-
priations process. Each member of Congress not only wants to
implement his own values, but wants to be re-elected and be
an influential member of Congress: he wants POWER [Ref. 6:
p. 177] . This power can be in the form of budget cuts and
threats to cut budgets. Agencies must fight for funding from
this powerful group.
Under the historical frame of reference created by the
incremental base, fair-share types of calculation, agency
officials are faced with a series of related problems.
How can they keep their base intact so as to have an
advantageous starting point next time around? How can
they increase their appropriations income without giving
the appearance of increasing them drastically? How
can they make new programs look like old ones? How can
they secure funds for new programs that are presented as
just what they are? Another way of putting it is to
ask how they can do what they believe is required in
the public interest as they define it within the context
of the budgetary system? [Ref. l:p. 102]
Fenno observes that subcommittes most often make incremen-
tal reductions in the President's budget, much less frequently
will make marginal increases in response to constituency inter-
ests, and very rarely will make large, crippling decreases
or huge, beneficial increases in executive requests [Ref. 6:
p. 179] . Part of the Congressional right to override the
President's budget is built into the system deliberately to
diffuse power.
An important factor in this subcommittee decision-making
is that decisions must be made under conditions of limited time
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and scarce information. They cannot possibly know all there
is to know about every program. Therefore, decisions are
often made by drawing inferences from a small sampling of
information. Fenno also observed that Congressional committee
members attempt to make their task more manageable by focusing
their attention on that part of the budget request that repre-
sents a change, primarily new programs and expansions in old
programs [Ref. 6:p. 181].
This would seem to be supported by results of a study done
by Kanter [Ref. 7] of the Defense budget during the 1960 's.
He attempted to determine whether Congress's orientation to
appropriations was primarily programmatic or incremental [Ref.
9:p. 129]. His findings suggest that Congress has more impact
in some areas than in others, and Congressional activity has
been concerned with more than reducing the level of expenditures
[Ref. 7:p. 130]. Kanter found that Congress almost always made
larger changes in the procurement and RDT&E areas than in O&M
and MP [Ref. 4:p. 134]. As a result, computation of budget
changes based on the total defense budget consistently under-
states the size of the change in the former two appropriations
titles and exaggerates the changes in MP and O&M [Ref. 7:p. 131],
The total DOD budget appears to emerge from the Con-
gressional budget stages virtually unscathed largely
because more than half of that total is virtually un-
touched as it passes through Congress. . . . Congress
has focused its attention on Procurement and RDT&E--
those parts of the budget primarily concerned with
present and future weapons systems. This Congressional
activity has been obscured in discussions based on
total DOD annual budgets. [Ref. 7:pp. 134,142]
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Kanter suggests that the "simple incrementalism" model
might best describe the O&M and MP categories, which are
less policy-oriented and therefore less subject to program-
matic budgeting bheavior [Ref. 7:p. 135]. Overall, however,
he concluded that Congress's approach to defense appropriations
was more programmatic than incremental and that they are con-
cerned about more than how much money is spent. They have
also shown a willingness to influence the content of national
security policy [Ref. 7:p. 142]. Procurement and RDT&E are
much easier to break down into program areas which can be
analyzed individually. These areas have more leverage in
influencing defense policy [Ref. 7:p. 136].
Budget reviewers are often criticized for concentrating
on increases and giving too little attention to items in the
base amount. The amount appropriated last year is not
necessarily appropriate for this year, and looking only at
items which propose changes does not require comparison of
the relative value of the old and the new [Ref. 8:p. 80].
Another factor affecting the Committee's decision is
pointed out by Fenno [Ref. 9]. He states that the Committee's
confidence in an agency can be shaken if there is evidence
that money appropriated in the previous year was used for
purposes not authorized by the Committee [Ref. 9:p. 334],
As a result, other agency programs may be put in jeopardy.
LeLoup [Ref. 10] suggests that there is a game which goes
on between the agency and the appropriations committee. The
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appropriations Committees of the 1980' s remain oriented to
budget cutting, and the agencies are well aware of this. Still,
most agencies present the Appropriations Committees with
annual requests for increases, based on a well-established core
program [Ref. 10:p. 82]. Agencies will most often contend that
their budget requests are carefully thought out and represent
only needed programs. Therefore, they feel their budget
expectations are reasonable and should not be cut. LeLoup
states that agency officials are unanimous in asserting that
they never pad their budgets [Ref. 10:p. 82]. They feel that
although cuts can and will be made, these cuts mean that
valuable programs will be sacrificed [Ref. 10:p. 82].
In Fenno's 1973 study [Ref. 11] of Congressional commit-
tees, he found that although budget cutting was used by Con-
gress as a means of influence, Committees also support execu-
tive programs by giving them "less than they asked for" but
"more than they got last year. " This would suggest that while
agencies claim no padding in their budgets, Congressional
Appropriations committees assume some "fat" and consequently
cut a request the vast majority of the time. At the same
time, they feel they are still supporting a program by giving
it more than the previous year. Agencies, on the other hand,
feel their budget requests represent programmatic demands, and
any and all budget reductions should reflect programmatic
decisions, not merely a percentage or incremental cut [Ref. 10:
p. 83] .
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Since agencies and Congressional Committees are not deal-
ing with an unlimited amount of money, the basic budgeting
decision becomes allocating scarce resources among all the
supposedly worthy and necessary programs. As Wildavsky
states
:
Expenditure limitation tied to national product—spending
cannot grow more than the proportionate growth of the
economy. Only so much can be spent and everyone knows
it. Politicians have a perfect rationale for turning
down demands--there is no money . . . under expenditure
limitation, the number of decisions to be made decreases
(because there is room for few new programs) but their
importance increases (because the affected interests,
in and out of the bureaucracy, must come to the politician
for decision, each knowing all cannot be satisfied) . . .
instead of being for or against a cause, politicians have
to balance competing values. Balancing and negotiation
turn out to be a politician's stock in trade.
[Ref. 12:pp. 24-25]
Although Key [Ref. 13] posed the question over forty
years ago, it remains relevant today. He saw the basic
budgeting question as "on what basis shall it be decided to
allocate X dollars to Activity A instead of Activity B?"
[Ref. 13:p. 86]. Economists might answer the question by using
the theory of marginal utility—distributing resources among
different uses such that the marginal return of satisfaction
is the same for all of them. By applying more of the business
and economic methods to the budget process, it is believed by
some that the resulting decisions will be based on "sound
cost-benefit considerations and will reduce the influence of
politics in the process" [Ref. 14:p. 67].
But in the Federal budgeting process, costs are much easier
to arrive at than benefits. To measure the benefit of
18
something involves values of the person making the decision,
and therefore, politics enters into it. Lewis [Ref. 10]
points out that the economic aim of budgeting, attempting to
achieve the "best" use of our resources, contains within it
many human and uncontrollable factors.
One big problem in budgeting is making forecasts of
what the needs will be tomorrow, and well into the
future. Hence, the government may decide to divert
huge quantities of scarce resources for a certain pur-
pose based not on firm facts, but on forecasts and hopes
as to the values to be realized. Not only must budget
decisions sometimes be based on sheer guesses, but
accomplishments in relation to cost often cannot be
accurately measured even after the fact. [Ref. 10:pp. 74-75]
Key believes that marginal utility theory cannot realis-
tically be applied to public expenditures, stating: "The most
advantageous utilization of public funds resolves itself
into a matter of value preferences between ends lacking a
common denominator" [Ref. 15:p. 90].
In the following chapter, historical data on the DON bud-
get is presented. By analyzing some actual figures, it may
be easier to see how the DON budgeting process is influenced
by both monetary restrictions and political decisions.
19
III. DATA BASE AND RESULTS
A. SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS
The source used for the budget data in this thesis was
The Budget of the United States Government [Ref. 12] from
fiscal year 1955 through 1984. GNP deflators used for con-
version to 1972 current dollars were obtained from the Economic
Report of the President for February 1985 [Ref. 13].
The figures shown in this study for the Department of the
Navy include both Navy and Marine Corps, active and reserve
forces. The aggregate figures have been broken down into the
four major appropriations categories which are as follows:
MILITARY PERSONNEL (MP) --costs of active duty forces of
the Navy and Marine Corps. Changes in financial require-
ments are primarily related to military personnel strengths.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) —costs of operating and
maintaining forces. Financial requirements are influenced
by: number of aircraft squadrons, Marine Corps divisions,
military strength and deployments, rates of operational
activity, and quantity and complexity of major equipment
in operation.
PROCUREMENT (PROC) —costs of acquisition of weapons,
equipment, munitions, spares, and modification of exist-
ing equipment. For the Navy, major items include aircraft,
weapons, and shipbuilding and conversion.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION (RDT&E) —costs
associated with modernization through development and
testing. Research is done by industrial contractors,
government laboratories and facilities, universities
and non-profit organizations.
The figures used throughout are the estimated outlays for
each fiscal year. Although the format of the Budget of the
United States has changed from year to year, the items included
20
are consistent in each category to ensure accurate comparisons
can be made. Current outlay figures were converted to 1972
constant dollars using GNP deflators. Dollar totals are
shown in both current dollars (Appendix A) and constant dol-
lars (Appendix B)
. All dollar figures in the tables and
graphs are in millions of dollars unless otherwise noted.
B. RESULTS
A first look at any body of data usually concentrates on the
overall picture, using aggregate figures. For the purpose
of this study, total figures include only the four major appro-
priations areas previously noted. This total comprises 90-97%
of the total Department of the Navy (DON) budget in estimated
outlays
.
The DON total of these four major appropriations areas, in
current dollars, has risen from $10,323 million in 1955 to
$73,274 million in 1984. This represents an average annual
increase of $2,098 million. In terms of constant dollars,
the total has risen from $16,968 million to $32,803 million
during the 30 years of study, amounting to an average annual
increase of $528 million. Figure 1 shows that while the
overall trend is upward, DON has experienced periods of
significant cuts as well as increases.
1 . Distribution of Funds
Table 1 shows the individual appropriations categories
as a percentage of the total. While the overall DON total
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TABLE 1
CATEGORIES AS A PERCENT OF DON MAJOR
APPROPRIATIONS TOTAL
(Current Dollars)
TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
955 10,323 29.53 34.29 35.60 .58
56 9,497 30.65 25.22 39.56 4.57
57 9,359 33.60 26.16 35.43 4.81
58 9,944 32.37 27.45 35.15 5.03
59 10,284 30.01 25.96 38.20 5.83
60 11,441 28.52 24.05 39.37 8.06
61 11,532 28.58 24.06 38.46 8.90
62 11,947 28.11 23.17 38.27 10.45
63 13,736 25.63 23.19 41.14 10.04
64 15,044 23.62 20.89 45.53 9.96
65 14,607 26.73 22.56 40.73 9.98
66 14,560 27.75 23.41 39.25 9.59
67 16,851 28.61 24.57 37.53 9.29
68 19,968 28.00 25.34 37.44 9,22
69 22,161 26.69 26.68 37.02 9.61
70 22,503 27.76 25.73 36.96 9.55
71 20,547 29.52 25.37 34.57 10.54
72 20,892 27.90 25.40 35.88 10.82
73 22,123 30.72 24.68 33.55 11.05
74 23,539 30.00 25.28 33.85 10.87
75 25,818 29.98 28.51 29.88 11.63
76 27,604 28.55 31.75 27.92 11.78
77 31,605 25.87 30.70 30.75 12.68
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1978 34,191 24.56 33.25 30.51 11.68
79 36,019 23.98 35.03 29.37 11.62
80 38,160 23.98 34.47 29.98 11.57
81 44,015 22.79 36.58 30.06 10.57
82 55,170 22.46 36.86 30.58 10.10
83 64,717 22.45 35.83 32.54 9.19
84 73,274 21.28 33.60 35.38 9.74
MEAN 25,567 27.46 28.97 36.57 9.63
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from year to year. Overall, looking from the beginning of the
period under study to the end, Military Personnel made up 8% less
of the budget in FY 84 than it had in FY 55, while Operations
and Maintenance and Procurement were down slightly by .7% and .2%
respectively. The only category to gain was Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation, with a rise of 9%.
Figure 2 shows that although their relative budget
shares have fluctuated, the overall rankings have not changed
udring the period of study. In FY84 as in FY 55, Procurement
received the largest share, followed by O&M, MP, and RDT&E.
In the inclusive years, these rankings changed as each area
experienced gains or cuts in funding.
2 . Availability of Funds
The remaining analysis will follow closely the examina-
tion of data done by Anderson in his thesis on Department of
Defense budget behavior [Ref. 14]. In the Anderson study, the
data were broken down further into three categories: 1) the
top ten years when DOD funds were "abundant," 2) the middle
ten years when the availability of funds was considered "normal,"
and 3) the bottom nine years when funds were considered "tight."
These categories were determined on the basis of the percent
increase over the previous year for the DOD total.
To facilitate comparisons between DOD and DON budget
behavior, data from this study has been similarly categorized,
using the percentage increase over the previous year for the












































Table 2 presents the data in constant 1972 dollars for
the top ten years for DON, beginning with 1982 which had the
largest percentage increase over the previous year.
TABLE 2
PERCENT OF DON TOTAL—ABUNDANT YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1982 26,604 22.46 36.86 30.58 10.10
68 24,192 28.00 25.34 37.45 9.21
63 19,165 25.62 23.19 41.14 10.05
83 30,053 22.45 35.83 32.54 9.19
67 21,315 28.61 24.57 37.53 9.28
60 16,654 28.52 24.05 39.37 8.06
64 32,803 21.28 33.60 35.37 9.75
77 22,567 25.87 30.70 30.75 12.68
64 20,674 23.62 20.89 45.53 9.96
69 25,534 26.69 26.68 37.02 9.61
MEAN 23,956 25.31 28.17 36.73 9.79
MED 23,380 25.75 26.01 36.41 9.68
When funds are abundant, procurement received the largest
share of the budget, followed by O&M, MP, and RDT&E. Figure
3 shows that although this is true on average, the early
abundant years represent a much different distribution than
the later years. Table 3 shows the middle ten years, when























































































procurement received the largest share of the funds, but now
MP is second, followed by O&M and RDT&E.
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF DON TOTAL—MIDDLE YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1981 22,503 22.79 36.58 30.06 10.57
58 15,057 32.37 27,46 35.15 5.03
62 16,922 28.12 23.17 38.26 10.45
76 20,858 28.55 31.75 27.92 11.78
59 15,214 30.01 25.96 38.20 5.83
78 22,731 24.56 33.25 30.51 11.68
75 20,524 29.98 28.51 29.88 11.63
73 20,919 30.72 24.69 33.55 11.04
61 16,634 28.58 24.07 38.45 8.90
74 20,455 30.00 25.28 33.85 10.87
MEAN 19,182 28.57 28.07 33.58 9.78
MED 20,490 29.28 26.71 33.70 10.72
Figure 4 again shows that this is by no means the case con-
sistently throughout the middle years. While this was the
distribution on average, and held true during the 1950' s and
1960's, by the early 1970' s and 1980 's, O&M showed a dramatic
rise, while procurement fell, changing the rankings to O&M
on top, followed by PROC, MP, and RDT&E. Table 4 presents
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the distribution has not changed from the middle years, with
procurement receiving the largest percentage, followed by MP,
O&M, and RDT&E. But again, as shown in Figure 5, the average
trend holds true only until the early 1970' s, when procurement
dropped and O&M began to rise, putting O&M on top, followed by
PROC, MP, and RDT&E.
TABLE 4
PERCENT OF DON TOTAL—LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1972 20,892 27.90 25.40 35.88 10.82
80 21,387 23.98 34.47 29.98 11.57
79 22,041 23.98 35.03 29.37 11.62
66 18,967 27.75 23.41 39.25 9.59
70 24,607 27.76 25.72 36.97 9.55
57 14,414 33.61 26.16 35.43 4.80
65 19,643 26.73 22.56 40.73 9.98
56 15,124 30.65 25.22 39.56 4.57
71 21,401 29.52 25.37 34.57 10.54
MEAN 19,771 27.99 27.04 35.75 9.23
MED 20,892 27.76 25.40 35.88 9.98
3. Growth Rates
Table 5 presents the overall data by major appropria-
































































PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1956 -10.87 - 7.47 -34.46 - 0.94 597.98
57 - 4 .69 4.49 - 1.15 -14.64 0.29
58 4.46 0.62 9.66 3.62 9.24
59 1.04 - 6.34 - 4.45 9.81 17.31
60 9.46 4.05 1.42 12.82 51.13
61 - 0.12 0.08 - 0.07 - 2.43 10.28
62 1.73 0.08 - 2.07 1.22 19.53
63 13.25 3.22 13.37 21.78 8.82
64 7.87 - 0.57 - 2.84 19.37 7.06
65 - 4.99 7.54 2.62 -15.00 - 4.85
66 - 3.44 0.25 0.23 - 6.94 - 7.34
67 12.38 15.84 17.92 7.45 8.97
68 13.50 11.09 17.05 13.24 12.58
69 5.55 0.01 11.14 4.35 10.09
70 - 3.63 0.23 - 7.09 - 3.7 8 - 4.20
71 -13.03 - 7.50 -14.23 -18.66 - 4.08
72 - 2.38 - 7.74 - 2.27 1. 32 0.22
73 0.13 10.24 - 2.68 - 6. 38 2.21
74 - 2.22 - 4.50 0.14 - 1.37 - 3.72
75 0.34 0.28 13.15 -11.43 7.33
76 1.63 - 3.22 13.19 - 5.02 2.85
77 8.19 - 1.96 4.61 19.14 16.54
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1978 0.73 - 4.40 9.11 - 0.04 - 7.24
79 - 3.04 - 5.30 2.16 - 6.68 - 3.54
80 - 2.97 - 2.99 - 4.52 - 0.94 - 3.36
81 5.22 0.00 11.64 5.51 - 3.84
82 18.22 16.54 19.12 20.27 12.95
83 12.96 12.90 9.81 20.18 2.79
84 9.15 3.48 2.36 18.67 15.71
MEAN 2.57 1.34 2.86 2.91 6.20
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category experienced from one year to the next. On the
whole, total DON funds in the four major areas rose 2.57
percent. Breaking this figure down, MP gained an average of
1.34 percent, while O&M rose an average of 2.86 percent and
PROC rose 2.91 percent. RDT&E, the smallest of the four major
appropriations areas, received the greatest average increase
at 6.20 percent. These figures are only an average, as each
category did in fact fluctuate between gains and losses.
The overall DON total went from one extreme of an 18.22 per-
cent increase to the other extreme of a 13.03 percent decrease.
Figure 6 gives a better picture of how much these funds
actually fluctuated from year to year. Tables six through
eight once again use the breakdown between abundant, middle,
and lean years for DON funds, to determine if a pattern exists
that is not evident when examining the overall picture. Be-
cause some of the figures are obvious outliers, median figures
are used to give a more accurate picture.
Table 6 shows the percent increase or decrease experienced
by the four major categories during the ten years when funds
were abundant. As may be expected, all areas received a
significant average annual increase. PROC received the
greatest annual increase, followed by RDT&E, O&M, and MP.
Table 7 shows that during the middle years, when DON funds
were considered normal, all categories except procurement
still received some increase, although much less than during
the abundant years. RDT&E fared the best, receiving an



































PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR—ABUNDANT YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1982 18.22 16.54 19.12 20.27 12.95
68 13.50 11.09 17.05 13.24 12.58
63 13.25 3.22 13.37 21.78 8.82
83 12.96 12.90 9.81 20.18 2.79
67 12.38 15. 84 17.92 7.45 8.97
60 9.46 4.05 1.42 12.82 51.13
84 9.15 3.48 2.36 18.67 15.71
77 8.19 - 1.96 4.61 19.14 16.54
64 7.87 - 0.57 - 2.84 19.37 7.06
69 5.55 0.01 11.14 4.35 10.09
MEAN 11.05 6-46 9.40 15.73 14.66
MED 10.92 6.46 10.48 19.02 11.52
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TABLE 7
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR—MIDDLE YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1981 5.22 0.00 11.64 5.51 - 3.84
58 4.46 0.62 9.66 3.62 9.24
62 1.73 0.08 - 2.07 1.22 19.53
76 1.63 -3.22 13.19 - 5.02 2.85
59 1.04 -6.34 - 4.45 9.81 17.31
78 0.73 -4.40 9.11 - 0.04 - 7.24
75 0.34 0.28 13.15 -11.43 7.33
73 0.13 10.24 - 2.68 - 6.38 2.21
61 - 0.12 0.08 - 0.07 - 2.43 10.28
74 - 2.22 -4.50 0.14 - 1.37 - 3.72
MEAN 1.29 0.72 4.76 0.35 5.40
MED .89 0.04 4.63 - 0.71 5.09
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4.63 percent and MP with a very slight increase of .04 percent,
PROC suffered the most, with an average annual decrease of
.71 percent.




PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR—LEAN YEARS
(Constant Dollars)
FY DON MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1972 - 2.38 - 7.74 - 2.27 1.32 0.22
80 - 2.97 - 2.99 - 4.52 - 0.94 - 3.36
79 - 3.04 - 5.30 2.16 - 6.68 - 3.54
66 - 3.44 0.25 0.23 - 6.94 - 7.34
70 - 3.63 0.23 - 7.09 - 3.78 - 4.20
57 - 4.69 4.49 - 1.15 -14.64 0.29
65 - 4.99 7.54 2.62 -15.00 - 4.85
56 -10.87 - 7.47 -34.46 - 0.94 597.98
71 -13.03 - 7.50 -14.23 -18.66 - 4.08
MEAN - 5.45 - 2.05 - 6.52 - 7.36 63.46
MED - 3.63 - 2.99 - 2.27 - 6.68 - 3.54
While each category now suffered average annual decreases,
O&M fared the best, with an average cut of 2.27 percent,
followed by MP and RDT&E. PROC again suffered the biggest
cut, with an average annual decrease of 6.68 percent.
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Breaking the figures down into these categories now
gives a much clearer pattern. Procurement appears to be the
most prone to change, receiving the greatest percent increase
during the years when funds were abundant, and suffering the
greatest losses during the middle and lean years. O&M fared
well during the abundant and middle years, while experiencing
the least cuts during lean years. MP was the steadiest of
the categories, receiving small increases in abundant and
normal years, and small decreases in lean years. RDT&E
fared the best during the middle years and quite well during
abundant years, but suffered average losses during lean years.
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This section will summarize the preceeding data by presenting
the relative rankings of the four major appropriations areas.
The Anderson study [Ref. 14] also presented DOD figures using
these rankings. Although his study used a total DOD figure,
including all appropriations areas, relative rankings remain
the same for the four major areas, so that a meaningful com-
parison can be made with this DON study.
Table 9 shows the relative rankings of the four major
appropriations areas for DON, while Table 10 shows DOD figures
from the Anderson study.
A comparison of DON and DOD data using these relative
rankings shows a high correlation. During both abundant and
normal years, relative rankings of the four major appropriations
areas for DOD and DON are exactly the same. Only during the
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TABLE 9
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF APPROPRIATIONS CATEGORIES











"NORMAL" 3 2 4 1
"TIGHT" 2 1 4 3
TABLE 10
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF APPROPRIATIONS CATEGORIES











"NORMAL" 3 2 4 1
"TIGHT" 2 3 4 1
Source: Ref. 14:p. 35
"tight" or lean years is there any difference, when O&M is
first for DOD and third for DON, while RDT&E is the opposite,
ranking first for DON and third for DOD.
Overall, it would appear the DON budgeting trends closely
follow that of the DOD as a whole. However, when using average
figures as in this and the Anderson study, many trends can
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actually be obscured. Some of these were evident by the
difference between looking at the tables with average figures,
and graphs showing actual trends. For example, Tables 2 and
3 show that, on the average, PROC received the largest share
of the budget. However, these average figures mask the trends
shown by their corresponding graphs (Figures 3 and 4). The
graphs illustrate that during the mid to late 1970' s, regard-
less of the availability of funds, O&M showed a significant
increase, overtaking PROC and receiving the largest share of
the DON budget.
In the concluding chapter, the data will be interpreted
further to see if the Department of the Navy budgeting behavior
can be explained by changing availability of funds, or whether
other factors do in fact have more influence.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. DON APPROPRIATIONS DISTRIBUTION
An examination of the distribution of funds among the
four major appropriations areas does reveal different trends
according to the availability of funds. While Procurement
fares the best during the abundant years, it receives the
largest cuts in the normal and lean years. O&M fares the best
when funds are lean, less well during normal years, and rela-
tively poorly during abundant years. RDT&E has the best
overall ranking in the normal years, second best during
abundant years, and does relatively poorly during lean years.
Military Personnel ranks second in lean years, third in
normal years, and worst in abundant years.
It appears that in the thirty-year history of DON budget-
ing in this study, Procurement has been the most sensitive
to the availability of funds. It gets the largest increases
when funds are abundant, and the largest decreases when funds
are lean. RDT&E also receives a larger increase during normal
and abundant years than when funds are lean. However, O&M
and MP show the opposite trend, faring better than RDT&E and
PROC during lean years, but worse than those categories during
abundant years
.
These findings strongly correlate with Anderson's [Ref. 17]
findings on DOD budgeting trends (see Tables 9 and 10, Chapter
III). They also support Ranter's {Ref. 7] observations. In
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his study, he found that Congress made larger changes in the
PROC and RDT&E areas, suggesting that these categories were
easier to break down into areas which could be individually-
analyzed. During years of abundant funding, they would be
able to add more programs, while programs could be cut in
lean years. The MP and O&M categories are viewed more as
a whole, and therefore are less subject to large increases or
large cuts.
Looking at the overall trends in the data collected for
this thirty-year study, DON budgeting would appear to be pri-
marily incremental. The DON budget experienced years of
varying growth or reduction, but never more than 18 percent
growth or 13 percent reduction in one year, and only an aver-
age of 2.57 percent p. a. growth. The Secretary of the Navy's
explanation of their budgeting process in a 1961 hearing
before Congress suggests the Navy derived their figures
through an incremental process:
SECNAV FRANKE : recognized that Personnel occupied a
more or less fixed position and, therefore, that any
estimates for Personnel would not be subject to much
change. We also recognized that Polaris has a very
high priority and there was not much we could do about
Polaris . . . with respect to all other programs, how-
ever, we said to send us in the first part of what we
considered to be more or less priority items, or first
priority items, equivalent to the direct obligations for
the Fiscal year 1960 plus 10 percent ....
CHAIRMAN MAHON : What was the purpose of adding the 10
percent?
SECNAV FRANKE : To give flexibility. In other words,
we felt it is possible over the years as the Gross
National Product increases perhaps the Defense Depart-
ment budget will increase by something of the same
amount. That was the purpose for the 10 percent.
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Items in our budget still were going to be eliminated
or increased as the result of individual program reviews.
It was a yardstick of a kind, so to speak.
[Ref. 18:pp. 71-72]
Zero-based budgeting was introduced to the military during
the Carter administration, designed specifically to emphasize
more of a program approach and avoid the traditional incremen-
tal approach. However, the approach to ZBB in the military was
similar to this agency's experience:
Program officials reported, apparently without realizing
the totally contradictory implications for the theory
behind the zero-base budget, that in preparing estimates
"we had to start from the previous year, then determine
what increases we wanted. . . . You've got to start from
where you are." They made two main points to support
this proposition. First, since they were best informed
about their present status, they could make some reason-
able estimate of the effect of more or less money for
particular programs. But they had no idea what drastic
changes--such as eliminating their programs, or cutting
them in half, or doubling them—would mean: "Increases
or decreases are about all we can swallow."
[Ref. 19:p. 283]
When deriving the Navy's budget figures, some areas are
easier to estimate than others. In a 1959 House Appropria-
tions Subcommittee hearing, the CNO, Admiral Beardsley, was
asked by the committee what part of the budget was actually
firm and what part was unknown. He replied:
I would say certainly the thirty-odd percent that is in
personnel is very well known, an I understand your ques-
tion. In the maintenance and operations area, we have
another 23 percent of our budget. That adds up to 53
oercent for those two areas. The procurement area is a
little less firm, as you know, as I am interpreting
firmness here. In the research and development area,
I would assume it is somewhat, perhaps, like the procure-
ment area: there is some flexibility or uncertainty.
If you get a breakthrough in another area, you might spend
more for one project than the other. The research
appropriation is a little less firm in some areas.
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In the overall, better than 60 percent of the budget
is very firm and can be very accurately determined—the
personnel, the pay and such, the maintenance and operations,
and so forth. [Ref. 20:p. 816]
Referring to Figure 2 and analyzing the trends of the
individual appropriations areas, it appears that two appro-
priations categories are quite stable, while two areas have
fluctuated greatly. RDT&E has been the steadiest, showing
relatively small increases and decreases. Whether funds are
abundant or tight, RDT&E still is perceived as an area which
must be maintained to some extent, as a hedge for the future.
Certain individual programs may be cut, but there is a rather
stable base which is maintained.
Military Personnel has also been relatively stable. The
amount appropriated has a high correlation with the number of
personnel, making it less of a political decision, but more
a function of personnel needs. As is evident in Figure 7,
the largest cut in Personnel came after the Vietnam War.
Since 1980, both numbers and funding for MP have begun to rise
again.
A much less stable trend appears with PROC and O&M. While
both categories have the same relative shares at the beginning
of the study and the end (PROC receiving the larger share)
,
there has been much more fluctuation in the intervening years,
with O&M receiving a larger share by 1977. Only in recent
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Figure 7. a. Number of U.S. Navy Personnel
b. DON Military Personnel—Dollar Outlays
(Constant Dollars)
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By viewing Figures 3-5, it is evident that regardless of
the category—abundant, normal, or lean years—this trend
holds. PROC received the largest share of funds in the be-
ginning years in each category, but by the end, O&M funds
had overtaken PROC.
These findings strongly suggest that the Procurement and
O&M appropriations areas cannot be explained completely by
an incremental budgeting process. They vary far more
according to macropolitical events, e.g., the Vietnam War,
disillusionment with the War, and the Reagan defense build-up.
Some of these trends are mirrored in the statements by
the CNO and SECNAV before Congress. In 1974, after a period
of decline in O&M funds, the CNO, Admiral Zumwalt, emphasized
his concern in this statement:
We have grave concern as to the effects of this on our
1973 appropriation and on the 1974 budget now before
you, particularly in the annual appropriations for MPN
and 0&M,N, and particularly on the current and future
readiness of the Navy . . . the cost avoidance actions
we have taken in 0&M,N have been equally drastic and
undesirable, with serious degradation of readiness of
forces and vital fleet support in all areas of the
Navy other than forces deployed to the Western Pacific.
[Ref. 21:p. 207]
By 1979, however, the emphasis was put back on PROC, particu-
larly lack of aircraft procurement funds.
Over the past several years, the naval aircraft pro-
curement rate has been in a precipitous decline . . .
the downward trend in combat aircraft procurement posture
is emphasized by the fact that not since 1970 has the
Department of the Navy procured even the minimum number
of tactical aircraft per year to prevent excessive
aging and eventual decline of the forces.
[Ref. 22:p. 522]
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It appears that while the basis of the budgeting process
may be incremental, areas which receive particular emphasis
from the Navy tend to fare better when presented to Congress.
By 1980, all four major appropriations areas were on the
upswing and in 1984, the CNO's statement to Congress reflected
this trend:
CNO ADMIRAL WATKINS : In 1981 the CNO cautioned that
without an increase in budget resources, we would see
perpetuation of a downward spiral toward maritime in-
feriority. I can report very positively on the current
state of the Navy because of the favorable trends de-
veloped with your support. As I said earlier, the Navy
is on the mend, but we must persist in our efforts if
we are to maintain the pace which will enable us to
regain the necessary maritime strength by the end of
the aecade. [Ref. 23:p. 433]
In the 1958 House report on the Defense Appropriation
Bill, it is clear how the programs ultimately preserved are
also influenced by both the ability of the Navy to justify
its requests, and the personal priorities of the Committee
members
.
This is the Navy-wide appropriation for research and
development activities. The Committee recommends
$495,000,000, a reduction of $10,000,000 in the budget
estimate of $505,000,000, and $3,000,000 greater than
the funds appropriated for the current fiscal year. The
Committee is not convinced of the need for the various
and sundry studies and programs presented in justifica-
tion of this appropriation request, particularly in the
realm of military sciences for which approximately
$65,000,000 was requested. It believes that this
reduction can be achieved without detriment to the
overall research and development program of the Navy.
The Committee cannot overemphasize the need for research
and development in antisubmarine warfare. . . . Such
efforts must be continued .... [Ref. 24 :p. 61]
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B. "PADDED" BUDGET REQUESTS?
The question of padded budgets seems to come up repeatedly
in Congressional hearings. Committee members are constantly
trying to get the "true" figures, reflecting the "true" needs
of the services. At the same time, they have a historical
reputation for cutting the President's budget, leaving the
question open as to whether the services then intentionally
ask for a little more than they need in order to survive
these cuts.
The Navy has publicly denied such a practice. Following
are some examples of the typical dialogue between the Com-
mittee and the Navy:
ANTICIPATING CUTS
CNO ADMIRAL ZUMWALT : judgment corporately within the
Government has been that the people will not support
budgets larger than those which have been submitted.
This judgment, I take it, is accurate, because the
Congress has reduced our budgets $2 billion, $3 billion,
$5 billion, and $3 billion in the past few years.
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER MR. FLOOD : You know very well we
are going to do that. You know how to handle budgets.
Those jokers up there will cut us about 2 1/2, so we
will add this 2 1/2. [Ref. 25:p. 129]
NO LOW PRIORITY ITEMS
CHAIRMAN MR. ADDABBO : I am concerned whether we have a
true priority budget. We have seen over the years the
game played with the committee and with Congress . . .
what we find too often is that you get a mix of very high
priority items, and very low priority items, going on
the belief that friends in the Congress will take care
of those other priorities by adding to, by changing the
budget request. ... Is that really telling the
American people how much we actually need, and are we really
working for readiness when we know that this is not the
true figure and not the true need?
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SECNAV HILDAGO : I know of no low priority items that
should be pushed out in order to accommodate a higher
priority item not presently in the budget.
[Ref. 26:pp. 535-536]
DELICATELY BALANCED BUDGET
CNO ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY : The budget we are presenting,
Mr. Chairman, is, as the Secretary has said, austere,
but it is adequate. It is balanced, and I ask this
committee to support that budget because there is no
cut insurance in it. There is no fat in this budget.
Cuts in this budget, and in fact, any alteration of the
balance within the budget totals could very well erode
the very slim margin of superiority that we have over
the Soviet threat. [Ref. 22:p. 568]
NO FAT HERE
CNO ADMIRAL MOORER : The budget requests before you
have been developed carefully and reviewed rigorously
to insure a balanced approach to that objective. Measured
by any yardstick, this budget is a "bare bones" budget.
The requests contained herein are minimum and valid.
I am prepared to justify them one by one. [Ref. 27 :p. 734]
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER : The Committee is aware of the
fact that you're here to present and defend the President's
budget. However, the President's budget is seldom enacted
as presented. . . . What are the low priority projects in
the budget and what are the high priority projects not in the
budget?
SECNAV MIDDENDORF : I don't see any areas in our budget
which would permit us to make any substantial reduction
and still fulfill our mission.
CNO HOLLOWAY : There are no "low priority" projects in
the Navy budget. [Ref. 28:p. 152]
"TIGHT" BUDGETS
CHAIRMAN MAHON : Another thing that I think would be well
to point out at the moment is that from year to year the
Army and the Navy and the Air Force come up and say,
"This budget is awfully tight. We have really been put
in a straightjacket. We just don't have enough money."
Or words to that effect. Yet before the end of the year
the services will come on in--the Navy is no exception
—
and say, "Well, we have got so many million dollars here;
we don't really have a pressing need for it, so we want
to reprogram in order to procure something else." In
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other words, while you talk about tight budgets, our experi-
ence from year to year indicated that the budget wasn't
tight at all, that you had a lot of loose money around,
and you come in from time to time on reprogramming action .
we sometimes wonder if, when you appear before us for your
annual justifications, the things you request funding
for, if they are so important, why don't you go ahead
and do what you said you were going to do instead of
saying, "Well, we are so sorry but we don't really need
this at this time and would like to use the money for
something else." This is what makes us a little skepti-
cal about these so-called tight budgets.
[Ref. 29:p. 617]
Although the subcommittee members most often feel there
should be cuts while the Navy would like more money, this is
not always the case.
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER MR. SIKES : When men in great stature,
in supporting this budget, leave the impression with the
American people that the budget is all we need, they have
the impression that you are satisfied with it. Therefore,
the American people have no reason to feel that there is
danger in this slowdown/cutback--that is what it is—and
they are naturally going to assume that all is well with
our defense ... I think we are deluding the American
people. I don't think we are spending enough. I don't
think we are going to be able to take care of ourselves.
In a very few years I feel that if this situation continues
we will not be able to withstand confrontation. ... I
am afraid the direction we are going now simply means the
next confrontation will find the power resting with the
other side. We all know the answer to that scenario. Do
you have that concern, Mr. Secretary? [Ref. 22:pp. 595-596]
C . SUMMARY
The Navy budgeting process is influenced by a number of
factors, making it hard to categorize by any popular term
such as incremental or program budgeting. While the Navy's
figures submitted to the President and on to Congress are
determined primarily incrementally from a given base, how
they fare in Congress is more complicated.
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One point seems to come through year after year, no matter
how many cuts are made or how tight the budget may be. When
asked directly by the Committee whether the overall budget is
sufficient to fulfill the Navy's mission, the overwhelming
response is that the budget is indeed adequate.
SECNAV NITZE ; You go through the long and elaborate
process of working out a budget submission. People
advocate a given program and make a very good case for
it. You finally work out things and everything gets
pared down. ... In the process of getting pared down
certainly you are not happy with all the paring that goes
on. Then when you look at the overall budget and ask
yourself the question—can you live with this, can we
carry on our commitments?. . . We do believe we can live
with this despite the paring down of $2.7 billion, but
that doesn't mean we are happy with it, nor are we ex-
pected to be. [Ref. 30:p. 679]
SECNAV GATES : I feel the budget is adequate. ... I think
everyone in the Defense Department would probably do
things a little differently. I think some of us are
inclined to think some of the things we know more about
are more important than the other fellow's about whom we
do not know quite so much. [Ref. 31 :p. 605]
While the budgeting process will never be perceived as
"perfect" by all parties involved, and some group or indivi-
dual will always be dissatisfied with the final outcome, it
does provide a series of checks and balances. A subcommittee
member summed it up this way:
The budget process in the Federal Government is a dynamic
process. Many individuals are involved in the prepara-
tion of the budget in the executive branch and many
others in the enactment of the budget in the legislative
branch. There has never been, nor will there ever be,
a completely perfect budget from any department or
agency. The budgets are the result of many compromises.
[Ref. 28:p. 151]
In summary, the data in this study support the following
conclusions regarding the DON budgeting process:
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1) Navy budgeting overall is primarily incremental,
although program budgeting has supposedly been in
force for two and a half decades, since the McNamara
era.
2) Politics plays a significant role in the Congressional
appropriations process.
3) DON priorities tend to hold up through the budget
process, depending on the strength of their testi-
mony and ultimately, again, the priorities of the
Congressional committees.
4) Budget cutting continues to be a fact of life as the
Navy budget passes through the committees. Folklore
has it that at least some budget padding is done in
anticipation of cuts. Regardless of whether or not
this is true, it seems expected by the committee
members and the budget is acted on accordingly.
5) Some appropriations areas tend to fare better than





BUDGET DATA IN CURRENT DOLLARS
DON
(in Millions)
MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 10,323 3,048 3,540 3,675 60
56 9,497 2,911 2 ,395 3 ,757 434
57 9,359 3,145 2 ,448 3 ,316 450
58 9,944 3,219 2, 730 3 ,495 500
59 10,284 3,086 2, 670 3 ,928 600
60 11,441 3,263 2, 752 4 ,504 922
61 11,532 3,296 2, 775 4, 435 1,026
62 11,947 3,358 2, 768 4 ,572 1,249
63 13,736 3,520 3. 185 5 ,651 1,380
64 15,044 3,553 3;,142 6 ,849 1,500
65 14,607 3,905 3 ,295 5 ,949 1,458
66 14,560 4,041 3,,409 5 ,715 1,395
67 16,851 4,821 4,,140 6, 325 1,565
68 19,968 5,591 5, 060 7 ,477 1,840
69 22,161 5,914 5,,913 8 ,204 2,130
70 22,503 6,246 5 ,789 8,,318 2,150
71 20,547 6,066 5, 212 7, 104 2,165
72 20,892 5,829 5 ,306 7 ,497 2,260
73 22,123 6,796 5 ,461 7
,
423 2,443
74 23,539 7,062 5 ,951 7 ,967 2,559
75 25,818 7,741 7 ,360 7 714 3,003
76 27,604 7,882 8,,765 7
,
708 3,249
77 31,605 8,177 9,,703 9, 718 4,007
78 34,191 8,396 11,,370 10 ,433 3,992
79 36,019 8,638 12 ,619 10 ,578 4,184
80 38,160 9,149 13 ,155 11 ,441 4,415
81 44,015 10,031 16 ,099 13 ,232 4,653
82 55,170 12,392 20 ,333 16 ,872 5,573
83 64,717 14,528 23 ,185 21 ,057 5,947
84 73,274 15,596 24 ,618 25 ,921 7,139
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APPENDIX B
BUDGET DATA IN CONSTANT 19 72 DOLLARS
(in Millions)
GNP
FY DEFLATOR TOTAL MP O&M PROC RDT&E
1955 60.84 16,968 5,010 5,819 6,040 99
56 62.79 15, 124 4 ,636 3 ,814 5,983 691
57 64.93 14, 414 4,,844 3 ,770 5,107 693
58 66.04 15, 057 4,,874 4 ,134 5,292 757
59 67.60 15, 214 4 ,565 3 ,950 5,811 888
60 68.70 16, 654 4 ,750 4 ,006 6,556 1,342
61 69.33 16, 634 4,,754 4 ,003 6,397 1,480
62 70.61 16, 922 4 ,758 3 ,920 6,475 1,769
63 71.67 19, 165 4 ,911 4,,444 7,885 1,925
64 72.77 20
,
671 4,,883 4 ,318 9,412 2,061
65 74.36 19,,643 5 ,251 4,,431 8,000 1,961
66 76.76 18, 967 5 ,264 4 ,441 7,445 1,817
67 79.06 21,,315 6,,098 5 ,237 8,000 1,980
68 82.54 24 ,192 6 ,774 6 ,130 9,059 2,229
69 86.79 25,,534 6, 814 6 ,813 9,453 2,454
70 91.45 24 ,607 6 ,830 6 ,3 30 9,096 2,351
71 96.01 21 ,401 6 ,318 5 ,429 7,399 2,255
72 100.00 20 ,892 5 ,829 5 ,306 7,497 2,260
73 105.75 20 ,919 6, 426 5, 164 7,019 2,310
74 115.08 20 ,455 6 ,137 5, 171 6,923 2,224
75 125.79 20 r 524 6 ,154 5, 851 6,132 2,387
76 132.34 20 ,858 5 ,956 6 ,623 5,824 2,455
77 140.05 22 ,567 5 ,839 6, 928 6,939 2,861
78 150.42 22 ,731 5 ,582 7 ,559 6,936 2,654
79 163.42 22 ,041 5, 286 7, 722 6,473 2,560
80 178.42 21 ,387 5 ,128 7, 373 6,412 2,474
81 195.60 22 ,503 5 ,128 8, 231 6,765 2,379
82 207.38 26 ,604 5 ,976 9, 805 8 .. 1 3 6 2,687
83 215.34 30 ,054 6 ,747 10, 767 9,778 2,762
84 223.38 32 ,803 6 ,982 11 021 11,604 3,196
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